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The second part of this book will be more attractive for the literary scholar, who 
can find an in-depth analysis of three plays (The Wmter's Tale, Othello and Hamlet) and 
its connections with current áreas of discussion. In the chapter on The Wmter's Tale, Prof. 
Bristol foregrounds the distortion of time as the playwright's device to portray 
contemporary social complexity, whereas Othello is considered a radical attempt to reveal 
the unlawful use of social institutions (marriage in this case). More interesting, from my 
point of view, is his reflection on the intelectual unacceptability of prominent conceptual 
features of these plays: the chauvinist picture of a passive female role and, in Othello, a 
blatantly racist presentation of character. Bristol sides with Bloom against the opinions of 
the so-called 'school of resentment': it is impossible to make a feminist or anti-racist 
reading of them, but their intrinsic literary valué still makes Shakespeare the pivotal figure 
of the Western Literary Canon. The chapter on Hamlet is a grounded acknowledgement 
of the character as the archetypical 'genius' of Western modernity, although the relevance 
of using a comic strip (Calvin and Hobbes) to ¡Ilústrate contemporary quotations of the 
play is hardly justifiable, specially for those of us who had never heard of it. 
Shakespeare's skill at entrepreneurship is nothing he should have had to apologise for. 
Neither should the author of this book for its commercial intentions. One would 
recommend leaving aside an academic reluctancy to this kind of presentation; reading 
this text will certainly contribute to our understanding of this world-wide academic, social 
and economical phenomenon which, whether we like it or not, Shakespeare has (been) 
turned into. 
John D. Sanderson 
Daniel Statman, Moral Dilemmas. Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1995. 174 pp. Col. «Valué 
Inquiry Book Series», n* 32. 
We must begin by considering what moral dilemmas are for the author of this very 
interesting, although not completely successful, work, Daniel Statman. A main problem 
is his very definition of a moral dilemma, and the initial picture of all his research project, 
a long and winding road around the project of reaching a strong and more rationalistic 
theory of moráis: 
"Moral dilemmas are puzzling situations, where agents seem to be under an obligation both 
to do, and to refrain from doing, a specific act. The possibility that such situations exist has 
been a matter of great controversy in the last decade. Some philosophers have argued that 
dilemmas are possible and, therefore, real. This view is often connected to other prevalent 
ideas in contemporary ethics, the idea of moral luck, and the «anti-theory» trend. Other 
philosophers have argued that dilemmas are impossible. In this view, we can never be under 
two real, «all-things-considered» obligations. This latter view is the one endorsed in the 
present book. I seek to show that dilemmas do not point to any inconsistency in our ethical 
reasoning ñor do they justify giving up the idea of an ethical theory. This does not imply that 
dilemmas are not troubling, or that they are not the source of justifiable strong negative 
feelings. They are, and I try to show why. If the argument of the book is sound, it will 
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constitute a modest contribution to a more «rationalistic» view of ethics and to what Robert 
Louden recently called «the re-affirmation of moral theory» (1992)." [p. 3] 
Beside the general difficulties caused by the problematic character of the very 
researching point of this work, there are other precise objections to raise, for example, the 
complete disregard of a major figure in contemporary ethics, Lawrence Kohlberg, who 
makes a deep development and use of moral dilemmas inside his theory of human moral 
growth. But this is not the only absence. 
In the first chapter, the author approaches what is one of his main objectives: to show 
that moral dilemmas in reality are not such, that they do not exist properly. One of his key 
arguments is that the difference between the supposed moral dilemmas and the daily 
moral conflicts rests in the quantity of the "wrong" that purportedly it is at stake in each 
situation, but it does not depend on any specific property of the situation. 
From this point of view, what in reality seems to occur with the agents in a moral 
dilemma is that are found in an uncertainty situation insofar as the real nature of the 
options that have before himself is unknown. It is this lack of definition and not the same 
nature of the situation what seems to be in the origin of the appearance of a dilemma. 
Again, Daniel Statman tries a rationalistic solution to the ethical problem constituted by 
moral dilemmas, forgetting that it can have other approaches. For example, the modern 
theory of moral education has indicated clearly that an individual can deal with a moral 
dilemma through no fault of information but due to lack of motivation, to lack of an 
adequate development of the moral will. 
The rationalism of the author of this work adopts its máximum expression in the 
second chapter, where a notion appears that, though seems to discuss the issue of the 
moral dilemmas, in reality considers it solved. Thus, the basic thesis of Daniel Statman in 
this work is that a correct solution exists, and only one, for each situation morally 
conflicting. This Statman calis "The Right Answer Thesis". 
Without looking at the problems of asserting the existence of a principie of this type, 
Statman says to us that this principie consists of two parts: the first part asserts that moral 
dilemmas have a right answer, and the second asserts, it is evident, that moral dilemmas 
are not real but constitute distorted situations, mainly due to lack of information in the 
agents. 
The principal objection against the principie of right response to the moral dilemmas 
formulated by the author of this work arises from utilitarianism. According to this theory 
in its contemporary formulations there is no rational solution to a moral dilemma because 
the valúes in conflict are incommensurable. The only one solution that the author 
considers is not to change of strategy in the treatment of the moral dilemmas, resigning to 
his hard theory of rationality, or at least widening it, but intends to escape to the objection 
of the incommensurability of moral preferences establishing something obvious, this is, 
that the incommensurability does not prevent the comparability. 
As Statman himself indicates, the objection of the incommensurability in reality is 
putting in question the same purpose in all his research project: the construction of an 
ethical theory in strong sense and with a clearly rationalistic character. 
Reviews 197 
It is interesting to this respect that, though Daniel Statman handles a wide classic and 
contemporary bibliography, within it he includes for example James Griffin (Whitechapel 
Professor at Oxford University); however he does not use the argument of this same 
author in connection with the problems of the so-called strong ethical theories. 
Regardless of these problems mentioned, and if we must emphasise some especially 
meritorious point in this work, indeed this would be its idea according to which "the 
ongoing discussion over the so-called reality of moral dilemmas is not a genuine one, or 
at least, is far less interesting and important than is usually thought." (P. 149) This 
interesting idea connects with the position, formulated for example by Dale Jamieson, 
according to which the abusive use of moral dilemmas in the contemporary ethical theory, 
darkens more than clarif ies its work. 
Beyond this criticism to the contemporary role of moral dilemmas is the problematic 
character of the global project that this work defends: the construction of a new ethical 
rationality in strong sense. This proposal implies to introduce Ethics in a long and winding 
road, a distant way to complete, and maybe impossible, rationality. 
José L. Tasset 
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